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Identification and Duplication 
Some elucidations on Goodman’s distinction between allographic and autographic arts1 
 
 
MARCELLO RUTA 
Bern University 
 
 
One of the key points of Nelson Goodman’s ontology of art, widely commented on during these 
last forty years, is the distinction between the autographic and allographic arts. The aim of this paper is 
to propose an interpretation of this distinction which is, in my view, substantially different from the 
one commonly accepted in the secondary literature. The paper is divided in two parts, aiming to 
identify two misunderstandings of the commonly accepted interpretation of Goodman’s distinction, 
according to which, the two key criteria to differentiate allographic from autographic arts are on one 
side the fakability (autographic arts can be forged, allographic arts cannot), and on the other side the 
fact of being notated (allographic arts are notated, autographic are not). This analysis should lead to 
provide a more appropriate interpretation of Goodman’s theory.2 
 
1. Allographic arts and forgeries: A first misunderstanding 
 
The distinction between autographic and allographic arts has been officially introduced by 
Goodman in Languages of Art. The first formulation is to be found in the following passage: 
 
Let us speak of a work of art as autographic if and only if the distinction between original and forgery of it 
is significant; or better, if and only if even the most exact duplication of it does not thereby count as 
genuine.3  
 
A few pages later he adds the following passage: 
 
A forgery of a work of art is an object falsely purporting to have the history of production requisite for the 
(or an) original work. Where there is a theoretically decisive test for determining that an object has all the 
constitutive properties of the work in question without determining how or by whom the object was 
produced, there is no requisite history of production and hence no forgery of any given work. […] definitive 
identification of works, fully freed from history of production, is achieved only when a notation is 
established. The allographic art has won its emancipation not by proclamation but by notation.4 
 
These two passages and the context in which they are inscribed (the first one is included in the 
Chapter The Unfakable) have created in my view a sort of hermeneutical bias, which has, in some 
cases, negatively influenced the philosophical analysis of this distinction. From these two passages it 
can be (and often has been) easy to conclude that the distinction between autographic and allographic 
art consists (simply put) in the fact that allographic artworks cannot be forged because they are 
notated. It can be stated that the argumentation strategy chosen by Goodman has created room for 
misunderstanding, which indeed has subsequently been the case. It is not by chance that Goodman, 
some years later, in an important passage from Of Mind and other Matters, explicitly takes distance 
from this interpretation: 
                                                          
1
 Ästhetik und Kunstphilosophie, 30. September 2014, XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie 2014 in 
Münster 
2 In this article there is a quite extensive use of quoted passages (the majority of them are footnotes, in order not to interrupt 
the discourse too often). The ambition of this article is to detect and correct a misunderstanding in the analysis of Goodman’s 
text. I think I should make all the necessary efforts in order to try to avoid, on my side, other misunderstandings. The use of 
quoted text is an important part of these efforts.  
3 Goodman, N.: Languages of Art, Hackett, 1976 (2nd ed.), p. 113. 
4 Goodman, N., Ibid., p. 122. 
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Two matters dealt with in Languages of Art need to be clarified or stressed: the distinction between 
autographic and allographic arts, and the notion of identification of works or their instances. Concerning the 
distinction between autographic and allographic arts or works […] the first point is that this distinction does 
not coincide with that between singular and multiple arts; for some multiple arts, such as etching, are 
autographic. Second, while the distinction between autographic and allographic arts is generally allied with 
the distinction between arts where there may and those where there may not be forgeries of particular 
works, the autographic-allographic distinction is not so defined and could obtain in a world of inventive 
angels free of imitative instincts or ill intent. Third, while availability of a notation is usually what 
establishes an art as allographic, mere availability of notation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition. What is necessary is that identification of, or an instance of a work be independent of the history 
of production; a notation as much codifies as creates such an independent criterion.5 
 
These sort of hermeneutical guidelines, formulated by Goodman, have been scarcely considered 
in the secondary literature, where often the unfakability, obtained through notation, has been identified 
as the (or at least one) crucial criterion in order to distinguish allographic from autographic arts. In 
order to try to eliminate this misunderstanding we will refer to a theoretical dialogue (a sequence of 
three articles replying each other) between Joseph Margolis and Arthur C. Danto, where they share an 
interpretation of Goodman’s theory of autographic arts which is, in my view, substantially wrong, but 
which helps to put ourselves on the right course to understanding which theoretical point Goodman 
really intended to reach in his argument about forgeries. 
The dialogue between Danto and Margolis, mainly relating to Margolis’ interpretation and 
criticism of Danto’s theory, is opened by Margolis’ article Farewell to Goodman and Danto.6 In this 
article, Margolis formulates the following interpretation of Goodman’s theory of autographic 
artworks: 
 
Put in very broad terms […] Goodman says that the difference between a real work of art (a painting, say) 
and a forgery of it, will always (eventually) be confirmed by way of a perceptual difference not previously 
noted.7 
 
This interpretation of Goodman’s theory can also be found in Danto’s The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace8, as well as in his reply to Margolis.9 So, curiously, both authors, while diverging about 
the main subject of their articles (Danto’s theory of artworks), agree, independently of each other, on 
an interpretation of Goodman, as if it were self-evident. Now, in my opinion this interpretation is 
substantially false, in two main respects: 
 
                                                          
5 Goodman, N.: On the identity of works of art in Of Mind and other Matters, Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 139.  
6 Margolis, J.: ‘Farewell to Danto and Goodman’, in British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 38, No. 4, October 1998: 353-374. 
Danto’s reply (Danto, A.C., ‘Indiscernibility and Perception: A Reply to Joseph Margolis’ in British Journal of Aesthetics, 
Vol. 39, No. 4, October 1999: 321-329) and Margolis’ last reply (Margolis, J., ‘A closer look at Danto’s Account of Art and 
Perception’ in British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 40, No. 3, July 2000: 326-339) were published about one year apart. 
7 Margolis, J.: ‘Farewell to Danto and Goodman’, in British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 38, No. 4, October 1998: 354. 
8 ‘Goodman in a curious way rejects one of the conditions of the question, namely the condition of indiscernibility. And it 
appears to be his view that indiscernibility is only momentary, that sooner or later differences will emerge. Knowing that one 
of a pair of things is a forgery is already enough of a difference for me to believe that there may “be a difference between 
them that I can learn to perceive”. […] And he enlists as evidence the extreme acuity of the eye and the ear in registering 
astonishing differences on the basis of the most minute changes. So it is almost a problem in psychophysics rather than in 
ontology. […] Finally, it may be said that it is virtually a matter of logical guarantee that there has to be a difference between 
two things not identical. But this is as much, I think, as can be said finally for Goodman’s analysis. The logical point, while it 
guarantees that if a is not identical with b, then there must be a property F such that a is F and b is not F, does not require that 
F be a perceptual property, and we have had enough practice with indiscernibilia to be able to offer actual instances where 
the differences are not such as may be registered by the senses’. (Danto, A.: The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, 1981, 
Harvard University Press, p. 42-43). 
9 ‘His [Goodman’s] theory, well enough known not to have to be repeated here in detail, was that the knowledge that one of 
an indiscernible pair is a fake gives us an incentive to look harder, in the course of which perceptual differences will sooner  
or later emerge that cause us to wonder how we ever could have thought they looked the same’(Danto, A.C., ‘Indiscernibility 
and Perception: A Reply to Joseph Margolis’ in British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 39, No. 4, October 1999: 322). 
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(1) First of all, it is not true that Goodman characterises the difference between an original 
painting and its forgery in terms of perception. As it can be easily seen in the following 
passage, the question, to put it in Danto’s terms, is not at all ‘psychophysical’, and not even 
epistemological, but purely ontological. We will return again to this point.  
 
Nothing depends here upon my ever actually perceiving of being able to perceive a difference between 
the two pictures. What informs the nature and use of my present visual experience is not the fact or the 
assurance that such a perceptual discrimination is within my reach, but evidence that it may be; and 
such evidence is provided by the known factual differences between the pictures. Thus the pictures 
differ aesthetically for me now, even if no one will ever be able to tell them apart merely by looking at 
them.10 
 
(2) Secondly, the point that Goodman is making is not at all that eventually some discernible 
difference between a painting and its fake will be detected (Margolis); and not even that this 
difference can be ‘logically postulated’ (Danto). What Goodman actually states is rather that 
such a difference cannot be excluded, as the exactitude of a copy of a painting can never be 
verified, and so a relation of identity between the original and the copy cannot be established. 
This uncertainty constitutes the aesthetic difference between the two pictures, because my 
looking at them will be informed by it. So in fact there is an epistemological element in 
Goodman’s formulation, relating however only to the aesthetic difference between a painting 
and its forgery. But this aesthetic difference is based on an ontological knowledge, namely, 
my knowledge on the one hand of the fact that one painting is original and the other is not, and 
on the other hand of the impossibility to establish a relation of identity between the two 
objects.  
 
This impossibility is in my view the key element differentiating autographic and allographic arts. 
The question of aesthetic difference between an original and the forgery is only an argumentation 
strategy, in order to stress the real critical point, which is namely the following: independently from 
any aesthetic consideration, in the case of allographic arts I can establish a relation of identity between 
two objects. I can easily verify that a copy of Balzac’s Eugénie Grandet is exactly identically spelled 
as the authoritative edition. They can have some other differences, but those differences are not 
significant. Eugénie Grandet is not characterised by a particular font, or a particular paper, but by a 
unique sequence of characters. This exactitude is something that, in the case of autographic artworks, 
cannot be verified, out of theoretical and ontological issues. 
So, Goodman’s previously quoted statement, ‘the autographic-allographic distinction is not so 
defined and could obtain in a world of inventive angels free of imitative instincts or ill intent’ now 
acquires its meaning. What differentiates allographic from autographic arts is the fact that, in the first 
case, I can establish the identity between two exemplars of the same text, while I cannot establish the 
identity of two paintings. Only for this reason, the forgery of an allographic work is not significant. 
There are not better or worse forgeries of Eugénie Grandet. There are only correct or incorrect 
copies, where the first ones can be considered like the original, whereas the second ones cannot 
because, strictly speaking, they are not even copies. Spelling is in this case the criterion for identifying 
an artwork, and spelling’s correctness the one for identifying its copies. In the case of autographic 
works, on the contrary; I need to refer to the history of production because there is no spelling of a 
painting, and consequently the correctness of a copy can never be verified. Goodman’s argumentation 
about forgeries has therefore only the function to cast light onto an ontological point, relating to the 
different identification strategies that I can put in place with allographic and autographic artworks. 
This difference, as Goodman says, would also remain intact by hypothesising a world without 
forgeries.  
 
                                                          
10 Goodman, N.: Languages of Art, Hackett, 1976 (2nd ed.), p. 105-106 
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2. Allographic arts and notation: A second misunderstanding 
 
Now we should further question why, according to Goodman, one can never establish the identity 
of two paintings. Goodman says it explicitly in the following passage: ‘We cannot cover every 
variation, or even determine a single absolute correspondence [between an original and a copy of a 
painting], in even one respect. Thus the search for a proof that I shall never be able to see any 
difference between the two pictures is futile for more than technological reasons’.11 What is somehow 
tacitly assumed in this key passage is the notion of density, which is later introduced by Goodman in 
the paragraph relating to the five requirements of notation12 (so mainly the requirements of an 
allographic art), and is then developed further in the whole text. The following four points should be 
stressed: 
 
1. Density must be characterized in opposition to the second and the fifth requirements of a notation, 
i.e. syntactic and semantic finite differentiation (or articulation).13  
2. A scheme is syntactically dense when between two characters there is always a third one. The 
same can be said for compliance classes at a semantic level.14  
3. Density excludes finite differentiation, even if non-density does not guarantee finite differentiation 
(in other words, non-density is a necessary condition of finite differentiation).15 
4. Non-linguistic systems are syntactically and semantically dense, and as such, not finitely 
differentiated.16 
 
Why is density decisive in this context? As Goodman pointed out in the previously quoted 
passage, the process of putting two dense objects in correspondence is infinite, and therefore the 
identification of the two objects will be necessarily provisory, no matter how much technology and 
precision I can put in place. The precision required by density is a priori unreachable. ‘Density, far 
from being mysterious and vague, is explicitly defined; and it arises out of, and sustains, the 
unsatisfiable demand for absolute precision’.17 This unsatisfiability is both theoretical (not depending 
on practical factors, such as technology) and ontological (not depending on subjective factors, such as 
perception). Besides, in this context unsatisfiability also means unverifiability: I cannot verify (out of 
purely ontological and theoretical grounds) that a particular object is an exact copy of another one.  
Now we can also better understand the role of notation. On the one hand, it is the notation which 
makes possible the identification of an object by the sequence of its characters, and therefore without 
                                                          
11
 Goodman, N., Ibid., p.107 
12 ‘In sum, the properties required of a notational system are unambiguity, syntactic and semantic disjointness and 
differentiation’ (Goodman, N., Ibid., p.156).  
13 ‘The second requirement upon a notational scheme, then, is that the characters be finitely differentiated, or articulate. It 
runs: for every two characters K and K’ and every mark m that does not actually belong to both, determination either that m 
does not belong to K or that m does not belong to K’ is theoretically possible […] The final requirement for a notational 
system is semantic finite differentiation; that is, for every two characters K and K’ such that their compliance-classes are not 
identical, and every object h that does not comply with both, determination either that h does not comply with K or that h 
does not comply with K’ must be theoretically possible’ (Goodman, N., Ibid., p.135-136, 152). 
14 ‘A scheme is syntactically dense if it provides for infinitely many characters so ordered that between each two there is a 
third […] A symbol scheme is analog if syntactically dense; a system is analog if syntactically and semantically dense’ 
(Goodman, N., Ibid., p.136, 160).  
15 ‘In such a dense scheme our second requirement is violated everywhere: no mark can be determined to belong to one rather 
than to many other characters. But […] absence of density does not guarantee finite differentiation’ (Goodman, N., Ibid., 
p.137). 
16 ‘A notational system, we saw, satisfies five requirements. A language, notational or not, satisfies at least the first two: the 
syntactic requirements of disjointness and differentiation. Ordinary languages usually violate the remaining semantic 
requirements. Nonlinguistic systems differ from languages, depiction from description, the representational from the verbal, 
paintings from poems, primarily through lack of differentiation – indeed through density (and consequent total absence of 
articulation) – of the symbol system. […] In painting and sculpture, exemplification is syntactically and semantically dense. 
Neither the pictorial characters nor the exemplified properties are differentiated; and exemplified predicates come from a 
discursive and unlimited natural language’ (Goodman, N., Ibid., p.225-226, 234). 
17 Goodman, N., Ibid., p. 253. 
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recourse to the history of production: ‘Definitive identification of works, fully freed from history of 
production, is achieved only when a notation is established. The allographic art has won its 
emancipation not by proclamation but by notation’.18 But on the other hand, the notation is simply a 
way, through a non-dense syntax, to eliminate the constitutive density of a physical object, and 
consequently to allow its identification through a sequence of characters. That is why it is neither a 
necessary, nor a sufficient condition for defining an art as allographic. It is because of the density of 
physical reality that paintings or sculptures are ontologically incommensurable with novels and 
symphonies, as we are forced to use the causal relationship (the history of production) in order to 
identify them. Without this density, things could be radically different.19  
We can now re-read the passage quoted at the beginning more expansively: 
 
A second problem concerning authenticity is raised by the rather curious fact that in music, unlike painting, 
there is no such thing as a forgery of a known work. There are, indeed, compositions falsely purporting to 
be by Haydn as there are paintings falsely purporting to be by Rembrandt; but of the London Symphony, 
unlike the Lucretia, there can be no forgeries. Haydn's manuscript is no more genuine an instance of the 
score than is a printed copy off the press this morning [...] Copies of the score may vary in accuracy, but all 
accurate copies, even if forgeries of Haydn’s manuscript, are equally genuine instances of the score. […] 
Let us speak of a work of art as autographic if and only if the distinction between original and forgery of it 
is significant; or better, if and only if even the most exact duplication of it does not thereby count as 
genuine.20  
 
The decisive point in this passage lies, in my view, in a small linguistic detail: in the allographic 
arts, I can talk of exact (accurate) copies; in the autographic, I must speak of most exact duplication; 
the density of physical objects makes out the detection of the exactitude of copies of autographic works 
an infinite process of approximation. Density, as we have seen, demands absolute precision, but this 
demand remains a priori unsatisfied. As I can never verify that a copy of a painting is exact, I cannot 
establish a relation of identity between them. For this reason, in order to identify an autographic work, 
I have to shift from the identity to the causality principle. Goodman’s argumentation is therefore based 
not on a perceptual, but rather on an ontological contingency. The distinction between autographic and 
allographic arts is valid in a world without fakers, but not in a world in which reality is articulately 
constituted. 
 
 
                                                          
18 Goodman, N., Ibid., p. 122. 
19 In a digital world notation would possibly not be necessary in order to identify objects without recurring to their history of 
production: ‘A symbol scheme is analog if syntactically dense; a system is analog if syntactically and semantically dense. 
[…] A digital scheme, in contrast, is discontinuous throughout; and in a digital system the characters of such a scheme are 
one-one correlated with compliance-classes of a similarly discontinuous set. […] To be digital a system must not merely 
discontinuous but differentiated throughout, syntactically and semantically. If […] it is also unambiguous and syntactically 
and semantically disjoint, it will be therefore notational’ (Goodman, Ibid., p. 160-161). The difference between notational 
(notational here is in my view to be understood much more as the sum of the five requirements, than as the fact of being 
notated) and merely digital is not so relevant for the argumentation. The point is that density, alone, precludes object 
identification without recurring to the history of production. 
20 Goodman, N., Ibid., p. 113. 
